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Relations and Value Chains in 
Global Production Networks 
  
Robert B. Koopman 
U.S. International Trade Commission
During the past 15 years trade between the United States and 
China has grown substantially. This trade growth has increased the 
economic interdependence between the two countries, resulting in ben-
efi ts for both, while also creating some economic tensions. China has 
experienced rapid economic growth and development with substantial 
decreases in poverty and increases in per capita GDP, which many aca-
demics attribute to China’s market-driven economic reforms and its 
related integration with the world economy. Up until the 2008 fi nan-
cial crisis, the U.S. economy experienced a long period of relatively 
strong growth through increased productivity and improved integration 
of information and computer technologies, as well as strong consump-
tion growth accompanied by a declining national savings rate. While 
U.S. consumption-led growth benefi ted from inexpensive goods from 
China such as consumer electronics and textiles, it has also resulted in 
growing bilateral imbalances.
U.S. import growth from China has slowed over the last several 
years because of weak U.S. economic growth, a drop in the value of the 
dollar, and a decline in imbalances. This chapter focuses on the period 
prior to the fi nancial crisis, as it aligns well with recent research on 
value-added trade, which is discussed in a later section. 
Researchers and policymakers have focused on three broad areas 
to explain the increasing trade imbalance between the two countries 
and, more recently, China’s growing trade surplus with the world. The 
fi rst area is China’s extensive use of policy instruments to encourage its 
rapid economic development and transition from a centrally planned 
economy to a market-driven economy.1 These policies include, among 
18   Koopman
others, incentives for foreign investment and export performance, the 
establishment of special economic zones and substantial infrastructure 
investment, and a fi xed exchange rate. A second explanation focuses on 
more macroeconomic factors, suggesting that signifi cant imbalance in 
the U.S. savings and investment rates, combined with relatively rapid 
consumption-led economic growth in the United States compared to 
other developed countries, have led to an increased current account and 
merchandise trade imbalance.2 A third area has been the rapid growth 
in fragmented global production processes, as businesses take advan-
tage of declining information and communications technology costs, 
and international logistics costs to distribute pieces of their production 
chain based on lowest cost sources (Dean, Fung, and Wang 2011; Hum-
mels, Ishii, and Yi 2001; Yi 2003). Although fragmentation of global 
production has developed independently of China’s policy environment 
and is a widespread phenomenon, a large part of China’s growth in 
exports to the United States has been in processing trade carried out by 
foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs), many of which have benefi ted from 
China’s pro FIE and pro “imports for exports” policies.3
In this chapter I present a summary of the U.S.-China trade relation-
ship prior to 2008 and describe some of the driving factors underlying 
the rapid growth in U.S.-China trade. I then present data on the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and U.S. import injury cases that support 
the notion that, from the U.S. perspective, trade relations with China 
are treated much like those with our long-term historical economic and 
political partners such as the European Union (EU) and North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries. Finally, I discuss cur-
rent research on value-added trade that could be important from a future 
policy perspective in understanding global value chains and China’s 
position in them. 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.-CHINA TRADE RELATIONSHIP 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 summarize U.S. merchandise trade shifts with 
the world and with China between 2002 and 2006. The overall U.S. 
merchandise trade defi cit increased to $915.6 billion in 2006. The long-
term trend in the U.S. trade defi cit remains a key policy concern for the 
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United States and its global trading and fi nancial partners. China’s rap-
idly increasing share in the merchandise trade defi cit—it reached $235 
billion in 2006—has raised particular concern. The factors and trends 
driving U.S. merchandise trade were numerous. Economic growth in 
the United States and its major trading partners contributed to increased 
bilateral merchandise trade fl ows in 2006, while strong growth in con-
sumer spending, business structures investment, and exports supported 
the economic performance of the United States.4 The rate of increase in 
the U.S. merchandise trade defi cit slowed from 17 percent in 2005 to 
7 percent in 2006, even as the defi cit grew from $858.4 billion in 2005 
to a record $915.6 billion in 2006. Total U.S. exports increased to a 
record $929.5 billion, a 16 percent increase. Aircraft, spacecraft, and 
related equipment; motor vehicles; and petroleum products recorded 
the largest sector increases for a combined $33.5 billion (27 percent) 
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of export growth, although export increases are recorded in every mer-
chandise sector. Meanwhile, U.S. imports for all merchandise sectors 
increased by 11 percent to a record $1.8 trillion. The energy products, 
minerals and metals, and transportation equipment sectors accounted 
for over half of the increase. The crude petroleum, motor vehicles, and 
petroleum products commodity groups recorded the largest increases in 
2006, accounting for a third of import growth.
The U.S.-China trade relationship continues to evolve quickly. The 
U.S. merchandise trade defi cit with China rose for the fi fth straight year, 
increasing by 16 percent to $235.4 billion, refl ecting the continued U.S. 
demand for goods produced in China. China is the fourth-largest export 
market for the United States and the second-leading import source in 
terms of absolute value. The continued rapid economic growth in China, 
coupled with China’s increasing role as a low-cost production location, 
contributed to the expansion in U.S.-China trade in 2006. U.S. exports 
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to China rose at a greater rate than the preceding years, by $12.8 bil-
lion, or 33 percent. The most signifi cant increases in U.S. exports were 
in electronic products ($3.2 billion), transportation equipment ($2.5 
billion), and minerals and metals ($2.5 billion). Increased demand for 
computer and telecommunications products by U.S. consumers contrib-
uted to continued growth in U.S. imports from China, increasing by 
$6.3 billion (16 percent) and $3.7 billion (26 percent), respectively. In 
2006, the U.S. telecommunications market grew at the fastest rate since 
2000, with demand for services such as broadband leading to increased 
demand for telecommunications and network equipment. 
Changes in the Composition of U.S. Trade 
While much attention has been paid to the increasing merchandise 
trade imbalance with China, it is useful to consider this trade relation-
ship in a broader context. Table 2.1 shows the changes in the composi-
tion of U.S. non-oil imports with a number of its main trading part-
ners between 1989 and 2007. China’s share of U.S. imports increased 
from 2.8 percent to 20.6 percent, displacing Japan as the United States’ 
second-largest import source after NAFTA. During this period China 
became the largest single import source country for the United States. 
In 1989, imports from the United States’ largest Asian partners 
(Japan, China, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore) accounted 
for 43.9 percent of U.S. non-oil imports. By 2007, the same share had 
dropped slightly, to 41.5 percent of U.S. non-oil imports. During this 
period, the U.S. share of imports from many of its other Asian partners 
declined. Between 1989 and 2007, the combined share of Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, and other Asian countries in U.S. non-
oil imports dropped from 41.1 percent to 20.9 percent. Thus, much of 
China’s increasing share of U.S. non-oil imports came at the expense 
of other Asian countries, particularly Japan, which dropped from 22 
percent to 8.9 percent of U.S. non-oil imports during the same period.
While the total value of non-oil imports from Asia grew substan-
tially, its share of total non-oil imports remained fairly constant, refl ect-
ing substantial growth of imports from other regions as well. This phe-
nomenon is particularly interesting because the composition of U.S. 
imports from Asia changed substantially, as more and more of the share 
of U.S. non-oil imports from Asia came from China. 
22   Koopman
A similar pattern arose in U.S. non-oil export shares (see Table 2.2). 
The NAFTA partner countries held a fairly constant share of U.S. non-
oil exports between 1989 and 2007, while large Asian countries’ shares 
declined from 29.2 percent to 25.7 percent of U.S. non-oil exports. 
As with imports, a fairly substantial shift occurred between exports to 
Japan and China. In 1989, Japan accounted for 12.1 percent of U.S. 
non-oil exports and China 1.7 percent. By 2007, Japan had dropped to 
5.7 percent and China climbed to 6.0 percent. 
Driving Factors in U.S.-China Bilateral Trade 
In general, bilateral trade between the United States and China was 
driven by FIEs, and more recently from a growing role by private fi rms 
operating in China (see Figure 2.3). Electronic machinery (HS-84) con-
Table 2.1  U.S. Import Shares by Country, 1989–2007
Year Rest of world NAFTA Rest of Asia Japan China EU15
1989 10.9 24.0 19.1 22.0 2.8 21.1
1990 11.0 24.3 18.5 20.8 3.5 21.9
1991 11.0 24.4 18.6 21.1 4.4 20.6
1992 11.3 24.5 18.4 20.1 5.5 20.2
1993 11.4 25.2 17.8 20.2 6.2 19.2
1994 11.7 26.2 17.5 19.3 6.5 18.7
1995 11.7 27.0 17.9 17.8 6.8 18.7
1996 11.9 28.3 17.4 15.9 7.3 19.2
1997 12.4 28.4 16.8 15.1 8.0 19.3
1998 12.6 28.7 16.0 14.1 8.5 20.2
1999 12.2 29.4 15.8 13.7 8.9 20.0
2000 12.6 29.1 16.1 13.4 9.5 19.3
2001 12.7 29.3 14.7 12.3 10.3 20.7
2002 12.8 28.5 14.5 11.5 12.3 20.5
2003 13.3 27.0 14.0 10.6 14.2 20.8
2004 13.7 26.5 13.7 10.1 15.9 20.1
2005 13.9 25.8 12.9 9.8 17.9 19.8
2006 14.1 25.3 12.7 9.6 19.2 19.2
2007 13.7 25.1 12.0 8.9 20.6 19.6
NOTE: U.S. imports, except Chapter 27, in percentage of total.
SOURCE: USITC and author’s calculations.
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stituted the largest and fastest growing product category for both imports 
and exports (see Tables 2.3A and B). In addition, China’s government 
incentive schemes, such as Economic and Technological Development 
Zones and other specialized zones, played a dominant role in China’s 
imports from the United States (see Figure 2.3 and Tables 2.3A and 
2.3B).5 
China’s trade pattern with the United States differs in some respects 
from its trade pattern with the world. Yao (2008) fi nds that while China 
ran a large trade surplus with the United States in machinery and elec-
trical products, it ran a substantial defi cit with the rest of the world 
in these products, and that China’s special economic zones played an 
important role in these trade fl ows. This, along with the general realign-
ment of U.S. import shares from Asia discussed above, supports the 
argument that China is playing an important role as an assembly plat-
form for Asia by importing electronic components and shipping fi nal 
Table 2.2  U.S. Export Shares by Country, 1989–2007
Year Rest of world NAFTA Rest of Asia Japan China EU15
1989 17.4 28.5 15.4 12.1 1.7 24.9
1990 16.7 28.3 15.2 12.3 1.3 26.1
1991 17.9 28.0 15.6 11.5 1.6 25.4
1992 18.9 29.1 15.6 10.8 1.7 23.9
1993 19.4 30.2 16.2 10.5 2.0 21.7
1994 17.7 31.8 16.9 10.6 1.9 21.0
1995 18.0 29.0 18.4 11.2 2.2 21.2
1996 18.7 29.9 17.9 11.0 2.1 20.5
1997 19.0 31.5 17.4 9.7 2.0 20.5
1998 18.9 33.5 14.7 8.7 2.2 22.2
1999 16.6 35.2 15.5 8.5 2.0 22.2
2000 15.6 35.6 16.4 8.6 2.2 21.6
2001 16.9 34.9 15.1 8.1 2.7 22.3
2002 16.0 36.0 15.7 7.7 3.3 21.2
2003 15.6 35.3 15.9 7.6 4.2 21.5
2004 16.5 34.9 15.9 7.0 4.6 21.1
2005 17.9 34.9 15.0 6.5 5.0 20.6
2006 19.3 33.4 14.7 6.1 5.7 20.7
2007 21.7 31.4 14.0 5.7 6.0 21.1
SOURCE: USITC.
24   Koopman
Figure 2.3  Disaggregating China-U.S. Trade by Enterprise Type, 
Customs Regime, and Incentive Scheme
China’s Exports to the U.S. by Incentive Scheme
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Figure 2.3  (continued)
China’s Exports to the U.S. by Enterprise Type
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Figure 2.3  (continued)




Equipment/materials investment by foreign-invested enterprise (25)
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SOURCE: Ferrantino et al. (2010).
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Table 2.3A  Decomposing China’s Top 20 Traded Products with the 







 % of 
total
1 85 Electrical machinery and associated 
parts
1,270 11 10,178 18
2 84 Machinery and associated parts 2,190 19 7,704 14
3 88 Aircraft, spacecraft, and associated 
parts
1,176 10 6,090 11
4 90 Optical/photographic, medical, or 
surgical instruments and parts
450 4 2,941 5
5 39 Plastics and articles thereof 351 3 2,716 5
6 12 Oil seeds, grains, and fruits 56 0 2,585 5
7 52 Cotton, including yarns and woven 
fabrics
834 7 2,082 4
8 72 Iron and steel 141 1 1,800 3
9 74 Copper and associated articles 146 1 1,774 3
10 76 Aluminum and associated articles 147 1 1,735 3
11 47 Wood pulp; recovered (waste and 
scrap) paper and paperboard
184 2 1,474 3
12 29 Organic chemicals 263 2 1,418 3
13 87 Vehicles, nonrailway 172 1 1,291 2
14 41 Raw hides, skins, and leather 111 1 876 2
15 28 Inorganic chemicals; organic or 
inorganic compounds of precious 
metals
39 0 687 1
16 81 Base metals, cermets, and 
associated articles
10 0 677 1
17 38 Miscellaneous chemical products 105 1 669 1
18 44 Wood and articles of wood; wood 
charcoal
29 0 551 1
19 98 Special classifi cation provisions, 
nesoi
148 1 483 1
20 48 Paper and paperboard; articles of 
paper pulp, paper or paperboard
142 1 466 1
Subtotal 7,963 68 48,198 87
Total 11,748 55,224
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Table 2.3B  Decomposing China’s Top 20 Traded Products with the 





 % of 
total Value
 % of 
total
1 85 Electrical machinery and associated 
parts
7,886 17 64,906 23
2 84 Machinery and associated parts 3,624 8 62,266 22
3 95 Toys, games, and sports equipment 6,222 14 20,892 7
4 94 Furniture; bedding, cushions, and 
lamps
1,979 4 19,358 7
5 64 Footwear 5,824 13 13,890 5
6 62 Articles of apparel and clothing 
accessories
3,277 7 11,858 4
7 73 Articles of iron or steel 556 1 8,367 3
8 61 Articles of apparel and clothing 
accessories
1,376 3 8,010 3
9 39 Plastics and articles thereof 1,623 4 7,465 3
10 42 Articles of leather 2,536 6 6,835 2
11 87 Vehicles, nonrailway 501 1 5,134 2
12 90 Optical/photographic, medical, or 
surgical instruments and parts
1,274 3 4,787 2
13 63 Textile articles 645 1 4,628 2
14 44 Wood and articles of wood; wood 
charcoal
225 0 2,997 1
15 83 Miscellaneous articles of base metal 324 1 2,982 1
16 71 Natural or cultured pearls, stones, 
precious metals
248 1 2,564 1
17 99 Special import reporting provisions, 
nesoi
202 0 2,502 1
18 40 Rubber and articles thereof 138 0 2,472 1
19 29 Organic chemicals 360 1 2,258 1
20 72 Iron and steel 198 0 2,176 1
Subtotal 39,018 86 256,348 89
Total 45,555 287,773
a HS = Harmonized system code.
SOURCE: USITC Dataweb.  This is an update from a table in Hammer (2006).
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assembled goods to the United States. Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) 
and Dean, Fung, and Wang (2011) show that a signifi cant share of Chi-
na’s export values refl ect content imported from other countries and 
reexported after some transformation. 
There has been a broad debate on the driving factors behind the rap-
idly growing U.S.-China trade relationship (Ahearne et al. 2007; Fosler 
and Bottelier 2007; Branstetter and Lardy 2006; Dean, Fung, and Wang 
2011; Hummels, Ishii, and Yi 2001; and Yi 2003). An extensive discus-
sion of that debate is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead I will 
discuss how this rapidly growing economic relationship generated trade 
tensions between the two countries, as represented by the United States’ 
use of international WTO dispute settlement panels and national anti-
dumping (AD) cases, and then present a summary of a novel method for 
looking more closely at this trade relationship that better refl ects global 
supply chains. 
The United States, China, and the WTO 
As part of an internal U.S. political economy debate and compro-
mise, Congress and the president agreed to changes in U.S. import 
safeguard mechanisms such as AD and import surge protections, as the 
United States committed to reduced tariffs in the Kennedy Round of 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations in 1967. 
As a result of that round and later GATT and WTO rounds, bilateral 
free trade agreements, and nonreciprocal tariff preference agreements, 
the U.S. average trade weighted tariff rate dropped signifi cantly from 
roughly 12 percent to 5 percent between 1967 and the mid 1970s, and 
continued to drop to 1.3 percent for 2007 (Irwin [2005] and author’s 
calculations). With the creation of the WTO in 1995, the United States 
has also made use of, and been the recipient of, formal dispute panels 
to resolve disagreements with its trading partners. These mechanisms 
are viewed as integral components of normal U.S. trade relations. In the 
next section I summarize data regarding the United States’ use of WTO 
dispute panels and national AD cases during this period to illustrate the 
fact that trade disputes between the United States and China are not 
much different from those between the United States and its other large 
trading partners. 
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It is important to note some important differences between WTO 
dispute panels and the AD mechanism discussed below. World Trade 
Organization dispute cases are brought by one or more governments 
against another government, and the cases are heard in Geneva, Swit-
zerland, by WTO dispute panels with three members chosen by the 
WTO. Antidumping cases in the United States are brought by one or 
more U.S. fi rms, or other nongovernmental interested parties, against 
one or more foreign fi rms. The cases are argued by private parties in 
Washington, DC, before two U.S. government agencies—the Depart-
ment of Commerce to determine whether dumping is occurring, and the 
U.S. International Trade Commission to determine whether that dump-
ing injures the U.S. fi rms. Thus it is inaccurate in the AD context to 
refer to U.S. cases against China, as the cases are brought by private 
parties before U.S. government panels. 
U.S.-China Trade Tensions 
The growing bilateral trade defi cit between the United States and 
China has generated concern among policymakers in both countries. 
Numerous sources in China have expressed concern that the U.S. gov-
ernment is making extensive use of WTO dispute panels, that U.S. fi rms 
are making extensive use of AD injury cases, and that the use of these 
mechanisms has a negative impact on the two countries’ “harmoni-
ous trade relations” (see, for example, China State Council [2005] and 
China Daily [2007a,b]). Many U.S. lawmakers and interest groups have 
called for the government to make more extensive use of WTO dispute 
panels and to make import injury mechanisms, such as AD, easier for 
U.S. fi rms to fi le, or to prove, and thus help slow the bilateral defi cits’ 
growth.6 
Below I briefl y review the use of these mechanisms in the United 
States vis-á-vis China and its fi rms and put them in a broader context 
for U.S. trade relations. Through 2008 the U.S. government’s use of 
WTO cases and private fi rms’ use of import injury cases (and the U.S. 
government’s determinations in those cases) appear to not single out 
China or its fi rms. Instead, the broad data appear to show that China 
and its domestic fi rms were treated similarly to the United States and 
its other major trading partners and general political allies, such as its 
NAFTA partners and the EU. 
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WTO Dispute Settlement Cases 
Between 1995, when the WTO was created, and 2008, the United 
States was a complainant in 86 dispute settlement consultations (see 
Table 2.4). The top fi ve respondent countries are the European Eco-
nomic Community, Mexico, Korea, Japan, and Canada—countries long 
considered U.S. political and economic partners. China ranks sixth, fol-
lowed by India, Brazil, and Argentina. The pattern that emerges from 
this data is that the United States views WTO consultations as part of 
its normal trade relationship with its major political and economic part-
ners, and that China and other developing countries with signifi cant 
U.S. trade relations are treated similarly. This suggests that from a U.S. 
perspective, utilizing the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is a natu-
ral part of a robust economic relationship.
Since China joined the WTO in 2001, it has ranked second to the EU 
in terms of number of panels with the United States as a complainant, 
followed by Canada and Mexico (see Table 2.5). This probably refl ects 
a combination of China’s rapid growth to become a major trading part-
ner for the United States. Recall that China’s share of U.S. imports has 
risen dramatically, roughly doubling since its accession to the WTO, 
and surpassing the EU as the United States’ second-largest trading part-
ner. If we compare the rankings in Table 2.5 with the import shares in 
Table 2.1, the data suggest that from a U.S. perspective our trading 
tensions with China appear normal and on par with our main economic 
and political allies. While China has expressed that it desires harmoni-
ous trade relations with its partners, including the United States, from 
the U.S. perspective it would appear that through 2008, at the WTO, 
the United States has treated China as it would any other large trading 
partner. 
Import Injury (AD) Cases 
Firms in China remain a major target for AD cases around the world. 
According to the Global Trade Protection Report, 2,007 fi rms in China 
were the main target of AD cases between 1995 and 2006, with 540 
investigations. Interestingly, U.S. fi rms ranked fourth being targeted in 
172 cases, behind the EU and member states at 502 cases and South 
Korean fi rms with 228 cases. 
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Table 2.4  WTO Dispute Settlement Consultations, since WTO 
Established with the United States as Complainant, through 
2008
Rank Respondents Total number of cases % of  total cases
1 EEC 16 18.4 
2 Mexico 6 6.9 
3 Korea 6 6.9 
4 Japan 6 6.9 
5 Canada 6 6.9 
6 China 5 5.7 
7 India 4 4.6 
8 Brazil 4 4.6 
9 Argentina 4 4.6 
10 Philippines 3 3.4 
11 Ireland 3 3.4 
12 Belgium 3 3.4 
13 Australia 3 3.4 
14 Turkey 2 2.3 
15 Greece 2 2.3 
16 France 2 2.3 
17 Venezuela 1 1.1 
18 United Kingdom 1 1.1 
19 Sweden 1 1.1 
20 Romania 1 1.1 
21 Portugal 1 1.1 
22 Pakistan 1 1.1 
23 Netherlands 1 1.1 
24 Indonesia 1 1.1 
25 Egypt 1 1.1 
26 Denmark 1 1.1 
27 Chile 1 1.1 
Totals 86 98.9 
SOURCE: WTO. Data generated by Ted Wilson, Offi ce of Economics, USITC. Per-
centage does not equal 100 due to rounding. 
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I do not discuss or estimate the economic effects of AD actions, 
as that is beyond the scope of this chapter, but for a discussion of the 
potential economic impacts of AD actions see Blonigen and Prusa 
(2003). Examining U.S. AD data, we can see whether China’s rapid 
trade growth with the United States led to a disproportionate number of 
AD investigations on fi rms in China, and/or a disproportionate amount 
of China’s trade affected by AD fi ndings. Table 2.6 shows that between 
2001 and 2006, fi rms in China were respondents in 20 percent of all 
U.S. AD cases (more than any other country, but roughly in line with 
China’s share of total U.S. non-oil imports), and that fi rms in China 
accounted for 31 percent of the affi rmative determinations. Thus, while 
fi rms in China were named in new AD fi lings in proportion to China’s 
U.S. import share, they were more likely than fi rms from other coun-
tries to be found causing injury to U.S. fi rms. For the longer 1980–2006 
period, fi rms in China were a party in only 10.5 percent of the cases, so 
the share of cases involving China had defi nitely risen (see U.S. Inter-
national Trade Commission [2008]). 
The above discussion focuses on the injury determination of the 
AD process. The long-run average since 1980 is 37 percent of all AD/
countervailing duty (CVD) cases (42 percent for AD alone) being found 
in the affi rmative, affecting 0.3 percent of total imports. Thus, China’s 
recent experience is not out of line with the long-term fi ndings for all 
countries. Also note that the dumping determination is handled by the 
Table 2.5  WTO Dispute Settlement Consultations, since China’s Accession 
with the United States as a Complainant, through 2008
Rank Number Percent
1 EEC 6 30.0 
2 China 5 25.0 
3 Canada 2 10.0 
4 Mexico 2 10.0 
5 Egypt 1 5.0 
6 India 1 5.0 
7 Japan 1 5.0 
8 Turkey 1 5.0 
9 Venezuela 1 5.0 
Totals 20 100.0 
SOURCE: WTO. Data generated by Ted Wilson, Offi ce of Economics, USITC.
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Department of Commerce, and its long-run average for affi rmative 
fi ndings of dumping is nearly 90 percent, while the ITC injury determi-
nation rate is much lower. 
Another way to look at the treatment of fi rms from China in U.S. 
trade is the share of China’s imports to the United States affected by AD 
cases. Irwin (2005) fi nds that rising U.S. AD activity on an aggregate 
level is related to the increase in import penetration, among other fac-
tors, and that the rise in import penetration is largely associated with 
falling U.S. import tariffs. 
Figure 2.4 shows U.S. imports from the world plotted against those 
affected by new AD/CVD cases. Since 1980, there have been occa-
sional spikes of around 1 percent of the value of imports affected by 
new AD/CVD duties; the long-run average, despite rapidly growing 
imports, is around 0.16 percent. 
In Figure 2.5 we see that China’s historical trade volume subjected 
to new U.S. AD duties tracked fairly closely with that of the world. 
Since 1980, there have been occasional spikes in activity of nearly 1 
percent, thus similar to the world total, however the average over the 
period is 0.16 percent, which equals the world total for that period. 
Figure 2.6 shows that, as with Irwin’s fi ndings, during the 1989–
2007 period U.S. import tariffs for the world continued to decline, from 
3.4 percent to 1.3 percent. Duties on imports from China fell from 8.5 
Table 2.6  Number of U.S. Antidumping Cases and Affi rmative Findings, 
China and Total, 2001–2006 
                             Antidumping cases             Affi rmative fi ndings
Year           China             Total           China          Total
2001  9  92  5            40
2002  8  35  6            12
2003  9  35  6            14
2004  9  34  8            20
2005  3  10  2              6
2006  4    8  2              2
Totals for            42             214             29            94
     period
Percent                               20               31
     China
SOURCE: USITC data and author’s calculations.
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percent to 3.1 percent, representing the biggest decline among the coun-
tries and regions covered.7 Such a decline in tariff rates and increased 
penetration is consistent with historical U.S. experience of rising AD 
activity. 
U.S. imports from China have grown rapidly since its WTO acces-
sion, but in the aggregate fi rms in China appear to be treated in a quite 
similar respect to those in the rest of the world (see Figures 2.4 and 
2.5). Between 2000 and 2006, less than 0.19 percent of total imports 
from China were subject to new affi rmative determinations in the 
United States, while the world average was 0.14 percent. Both of these 































Figure 2.4  U.S. Imports from the World, and Percentage Affected by 
Affi rmative AD/CVD Findings
SOURCE: USITC data and author’s calculations.
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the period 1980–1999, imports from China were much less affected 
by new AD cases in the United States than the world average. Imports 
from China during the pre-WTO accession era (1980–1990) averaged 
only 0.11 percent of import value subject to a new affi rmative decision, 
while imports for the world over the same period averaged 0.18 percent. 
Thus, since WTO accession and 2006, China moved more in line with 
the average treatment in terms of U.S. imports subject to AD duties. 
Thus, in terms of two measures of trade tensions, the numbers of 
WTO dispute settlement panels and the share of imports affected by 
import injury fi ndings, we see that the United States largely treated 
Figure 2.5  U.S. Imports from China, and Percentage Affected by 


































SOURCE: USITC and author’s calculations.
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China and its fi rms as it did any other major trading partner, includ-
ing its main political and economic allies. In the United States, as in 
other countries, the number of AD cases brought against fi rms in China 
has been increasing, and the number of cases involving fi rms in China 
found affi rmative in the injury phase has risen above the world average. 
These data suggest that China’s concerns that U.S. actions in the WTO 
and in its national import injury cases indicate that the United States 
does not care about harmonious trade relations may be misplaced and 
simply refl ect a difference in culture and expectations as to how each 
side defi nes harmonious and normal trade relations. 
Apart from growing trade tensions, the rise of China as a supplier 
to the world is remarkable. The next part of this chapter focuses on a 
methodology to better understand how globalization—and the develop-
ment of global value chains that appear to focus on China—may affect 
traditional gross trade values often used to describe bilateral trade rela-
tions. These insights, based on the domestic and foreign value embed-



















SOURCE: USITC and author’s calculations.
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ded in gross trade data, suggest that the trade relationship between the 
United States and China is more complicated than traditional data sug-
gest, and that Japan and other Asian countries export indirectly to the 
United States through China.
VALUE ADDED IN CHINESE EXPORTS 
Recently, Pascal Lamy, director general of the WTO, suggested that 
“. . . by focusing on gross values of exports and imports, traditional trade 
statistics also give us a distorted picture of trade imbalances between 
countries.” He argues that value-added trade statistics help reveal that 
the macroeconomic imbalances present in the current global economy 
are not likely to be corrected through focus on bilateral trade defi cits 
(Lamy 2011). 
In the United States there has been great political and press atten-
tion paid to the long-term current account defi cit, and particularly 
the bilateral trade defi cit with China. At the U.S. International Trade 
Commission, beginning shortly after China’s accession to the WTO in 
the early 2000s, we started receiving requests from our governmental 
customers regarding the growing trade imbalance with China. We fi rst 
gathered data similar to that seen in Figure 2.7, traditional import values 
showing rising imports from China, and much of the rest of the world in 
value terms. Of course, when the questions fi rst came in we had not yet 
experienced the recession of 2008 related to the fi nancial crisis, so the 
path of import growth was fairly steadily upward, except for the 2001 
recession. We next transformed the data into shares as seen in Figure 
2.8, which plainly shows that something important was going on in 
Asia, and that much of it was related to Asian supply chain realignment 
and a focus on China as a point of fi nal assembly in those chains. How-
ever, we had no way of clearly showing these links in the aggregate data 
at that time. Groups highly critical of trade referred to data such as that 
in Figure 2.7 and generally focused on China for keeping its currency 
artifi cially low in order to increase exports to the United States, among 
other countries. Critics argued that since other Asian countries contin-
ued to expand exports to the United States, China’s increased exports 
were essentially completely offsetting domestic production, not substi-
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Figure 2.8  U.S. Imports Shares from Asia and NAFTA, 1989–2009
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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tuting for other Asian exports. Further, trade critics often pointed out 
that low prices from China, due to the currency undervaluation, stimu-
lated demand in the United States for Chinese imports, and were then 
generating a growing current account defi cit. To better address these 
kinds of comments we then developed data similar to that presented 
in Figure 2.9, which suggest that macro factors, particularly relatively 
strong economic growth—exhibited in this fi gure through a stable, low 
unemployment rate through most of the period, and relatively robust 
economic growth in the United States compared to other developed 
countries, combined with a low savings rate—were the main contribu-
tors to growing trade defi cits. Despite the various forms of data pre-
sented, there was no clear “smoking gun” linking other Asian countries 
to Chinese exports. Similar arguments and concerns were expressed 
regarding NAFTA trade fl ows. 
Methods for Understanding Domestic and Foreign Value Added 
in Trade 
These efforts to inform our customers and the need to more fully 
understand what was happening in global trade fl ows led us to delve 
fairly deeply into value-added trade issues.8 How would one assess 
foreign versus domestic content in a country’s exports? In one of the 
literature’s most infl uential papers, Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001; HIY 
in subsequent discussion) propose a method to decompose a country’s 
exports into domestic and foreign value-added (FVA) share based on a 
country’s input-output (IO) table. Hummels, Ishii, and Yi make a key 
assumption that the intensity in the use of imported inputs is the same 
between production for exports and production for domestic sales. 
However, this assumption is violated in the presence of processing 
exports, a prevalent part of China’s export and import markets. Pro-
cessing exports are characterized by imports for exports with favor-
able tariff treatment: fi rms import parts and other intermediate materials 
from abroad, with tariff exemptions on the imported inputs and other 
tax preferences from local or central governments, and, after process-
ing or assembling, export the fi nished products. The policy preferences 
for processing exports usually lead to a signifi cant difference in the 
intensity of imported intermediate inputs in the production of process-
ing exports and that in other demand sources (for domestic fi nal sales 
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and normal exports). Since processing exports have accounted for more 
than 50 percent of China’s exports every year at least since 1996, we 
felt that the HIY formula was likely to lead to a signifi cant underesti-
mation of the share of FVA in its exports. In fact, most economies offer 
tariff reductions or exemptions on imported intermediate inputs used in 
production for exports. By ignoring processing exports, one is likely to 
incorrectly estimate domestic and foreign content in trade, especially 
for economies that engage in a massive amount of tariff/tax-favored 
processing trade, such as China, Mexico, and Vietnam. 
In Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008; KWW in subsequent discus-
sion), we aim to make two contributions to the literature. First, we pres-
ent a formula for computing shares of foreign and domestic value added 
(DVA) in a country’s exports when processing exports are pervasive. 
We develop this formula because we believe the production technology 
and input sourcing differs for goods produced for domestic consump-
tion and normal exports compared to those produced under export pro-
cessing regimes. We show that the HIY formula is a special case of this 
general formula. Second, we applied our methodology to China using 
data for 1997, 2002, and 2007. We estimate that the share of FVA in Chi-
na’s manufactured exports was about 50 percent in 1997–2002 before 
China’s WTO membership—almost twice as high as that implied by the 
HIY formula—and has risen to over 60 percent in 2007 after fi ve years 
of its WTO membership. Our method and data also allow us to examine 
sectoral level results, and we fi nd interesting variations across sectors. 
Those sectors that are likely labeled as relatively sophisticated, such as 
computers, telecommunications equipment, and electronic devices, had 
particularly low domestic content (about 30 percent or less). 
The approach in KWW is an accounting exercise and does not thor-
oughly examine the determinants, driving forces, and consequences 
of changes in domestic contents in China’s gross exports. However, 
we believe we produced a solid methodology to estimate and account 
domestic and FVA in developing countries exports as a necessary fi rst 
step toward a better understanding of these issues.
Besides HIY and related papers on vertical specialization, KWW is 
also related to the input-output (IO) literature. In particular, Chen et al. 
(2008) and Lau et al. (2007) are the fi rst to develop a “noncompetitive” 
type IO model for China (i.e., one in which imported and domestically 
produced inputs are accounted for separately) and to incorporate pro-
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cessing exports explicitly. However, we believe that these papers do not 
describe a systematic way to infer separate IO coeffi cients for produc-
tion of processing exports versus those for other fi nal demands. As a 
result it is diffi cult for others to replicate their estimates or apply their 
methodologies to other countries. In addition, KWW use an aggregated 
version of China’s 1995 and 2002 IO tables, respectively, to perform 
their analysis, with 20 some goods-producing industries. We provide a 
more up-to-date and more disaggregated assessment of FVA and DVA 
in Chinese exports with 83 goods-producing industries. Finally, they 
imposed an assumption in estimating the import use matrix from the 
competitive type IO table published by China’s National Statistical 
Bureau: within each industry, the mix of the imported and domestic 
inputs is the same in capital formation, intermediate inputs, and fi nal 
consumption. We relaxed this assumption by refi ning a method pro-
posed in Dean, Fung, and Wang (2011) that combines China’s process-
ing imports statistics with the United Nations Broad Economic Catego-
ries classifi cation. 
The KWW Methodology 
In this section we summarize the methodology developed in KWW. 
As the reader will see, the method is particularly innovative and gen-
erates very useful insights regarding domestic and foreign content of 
Chinese trade. This method has also been applied to Mexico’s exports 
in De La Cruz et al. (2010), and more recently extended in a substantial 
way to examine global trade in value added in Koopman et al. (2010). 
In KWW we use very detailed information on China’s trade regimes, 
bilateral and at the tariff line, to modify China’s economy-wide IO data 
to refl ect the substantial technology differences between its processing 
sectors and nonprocessing sectors. Our goal was to build on existing lit-
erature to split China’s IO table into two parts, processing and nonpro-
cessing, which would more accurately refl ect the fact that the process-
ing sector intensively used imported components that did not enter the 
domestic economy for other uses in fi nal demand. Table 2.7 provides a 
sense of what we are trying to accomplish. We are essentially trying to 
estimate the values in the columns of the IO matrix for production for 
domestic use and normal exports and production of processing exports. 
A mathematical description of the approach follows. 
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Table 2.7  Input-Output Table with Separate Production Account for Processing Trade
Intermediate use
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SOURCE: Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008).
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We use superscript P and D, respectively, to represent process-
ing exports and domestic sales and normal exports. This expanded IO 
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Substituting Equation (2.6) into Equation (2.5), we have 
(2.7) 1 1( ) ( ) (1 )P DD D P DD DP pX E I A Y E A A E      
Substituting Equation (2.7) into Equation (2.2), the total demand for 
imported intermediate inputs is
 
(2.8) 1 1( ) ( ) (1 )M MD DD D P MD DD DP PM Y A I A Y E A A A E      
 MP pA E
It has three components: the fi rst term is total imported content in fi nal 
domestic sale and normal exports, and the second and third terms are 
indirect and direct imported content in processing exports, respectively.
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We can compute vertical specialization (VS) or foreign content 
share in processing and normal exports in each industry separately: 
(2.9) 1
1
( )  
(1 )
T TD MD DD
P MD DD DP MP
VSS uA I A






The total foreign content share in a particular industry is the sum of the 
two weighted by the share of processing and nonprocessing exports sp 
and u−sp, where both s and u are a 1 by n vector:
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The foreign content (or FVA) share in a country’s total exports is
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where te is a scalar, the country’s total exports. Equation (2.11) is a 
generalization of Equation (2.1), the formula to compute industry-level 
share of vertical specialization. Equation (2.11) is a generalization of 
the formula for country-level share of vertical specialization proposed 
by Hummels et al. (2001, p. 80). In particular, either when ADD = ADP 
and AMD = AMP , or when EP/te = 0, Equation (2.11) reduces to the HIY 
formula for VS.
Similarly, the domestic content share for processing and normal 
exports at the industry level can be computed separately:
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The total domestic content share in a particular industry is a weighted 
sum of the two:
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Either when ADD = ADP and DvA  = 
P
vA  or when EP/te = 0, Equation (2.14) 
reduces to the HIY formula. We can easily verify that for both process-
ing and normal exports, the sum of domestic and foreign content shares 
is unity. 
However, statistical agencies typically only report a traditional IO 
matrix, AD, and sometimes AM, but not ADP, ADD, AMP, and AMD sepa-
rately. Therefore, a method to estimate these matrices, based on avail-
able information, had to be developed. In KWW we accomplish this 
through a quadratic programming model by combining information 
from trade statistics and conventional IO tables. The basic idea of this 
model is to use information from the standard IO table to determine 
sector-level total imports/exports, and information from trade statistics 
to determine the relative proportion of processing and normal exports 
within each sector, and thus use up all available data to split the national 
economy into processing and nonprocessing blocks, each with its own 
IO structure. Using the data from the IO table to determine sector-level 
total imports/exports helps to ensure that the balance conditions in the 
offi cial IO account are always satisfi ed, and that the IO table with sepa-
rate processing and nonprocessing accounts estimated from the model 
always sums to the published offi cial table. Such a method is a for-
malization of the calibration methods widely used in macroeconomics 
and CGE modeling when the number of endogenous variables is larger 
than the number of equations (see KWW, pp. 9–14, for details of the 
method). 
Estimation results   
Table 2.8 presents the results from KWW for the decomposition of 
aggregate FVA and DVA shares in 1997, 2002, and 2007. For compari-
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son, the results from the HIY method that ignores processing trade are 
also reported. The estimated aggregate DVA share in China’s merchan-
dise exports was 54 percent in 1997 and 60.6 percent in 2007. For man-
ufacturing products, these estimated shares are slightly lower in levels 
but trending upward signifi cantly at 50 percent in 1997 and 59.7 percent 
in 2007, respectively. In general, the estimated direct DVA shares are 
less than half of the total DVA shares. However, the estimated indi-
rect FVA share was relatively small; most of the foreign content comes 
from directly imported foreign inputs, especially in 1997 and 2002. The 
indirect FVA increase over time and reach about a quarter of China’s 
directly imported foreign inputs in 2007, indicating that the share of 
simple processing and assembling of foreign parts is declining, while 
more imported intermediates are being used in the production of other 
intermediate inputs that are then used in the production process. 
Relative to the estimates from the HIY method, our procedure pro-
duces estimates of a much higher share of FVA in Chinese gross exports 
and with a different trend over time. To be more precise, estimates from 
the HIY method show that the foreign content share (total vs. share) 
increased steadily from 17.6 percent in 1997 to 28.7 percent in 2007 
for all merchandise exports, and from 19.0 percent to 27.1 percent for 
manufacturing only during the same period. In contrast, our estimates 
Table 2.8  Shares of Domestic and Foreign Value Added in Total 
Exports (%) 
The HIY method The KWW method
1997 2002 2007 1997 2002 2007
All merchandise
Total foreign value added 17.6 25.1 28.7 46.0 46.1 39.4
Direct foreign value added 8.9 14.7 13.7 44.4 42.5 31.6
Total domestic value added 82.4 74.9 71.3 54.0 53.9 60.6
Direct domestic value added 29.4 26.0 20.3 22.2 19.7 17.1
Manufacturing goods only
Total foreign value added 19.0 26.4 27.1 50.0 48.7 40.3
Direct foreign value added 9.7 15.6 16.3 48.3 45.1 32.4
Total domestic value added 81.1 73.6 72.9 50.0 51.3 59.7
Direct domestic value added 27.5 24.6 24.6 19.6 18.1 16.5
SOURCE: Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008).
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suggest a trend in the opposite direction, with the share of FVA in all 
merchandise exports falling from 46 percent in 1997 to 39.4 percent 
in 2007, and a similar decline for the share in manufacturing exports, 
which fell from 50 percent in 1997 to 40.3 percent in 2007. The decline 
occurs mainly during the 2002–2007 period, which corresponds to the 
fi rst fi ve years of China’s entry to the WTO. Our estimates indicate that 
the HIY method appears to incorrectly estimate both the level and the 
trend in domestic versus foreign content in the People’s Republic of 
China exports.
What accounts for the difference between our and the HIY 
approaches? There are at least three factors that drive the change of 
foreign content of the country’s gross exports: 1) the relative propor-
tions of its total imports used as intermediate inputs in producing pro-
cessing exports and domestic sales and normal exports; 2) the share of 
processing exports in its total exports; and 3) the sector composition of 
its exports. Because processing exports tend to use substantially more 
imported inputs, and processing exports account for a major share of 
China’s total exports, the HIY indicator is likely to substantially under-
estimate the true foreign content in China’s exports. This explains why 
the level of domestic content by our measure is much lower than that of 
the HIY indicator. On the other hand, as exporting fi rms (both those pro-
ducing for normal exports and those for processing exports) gradually 
increase their intermediate inputs sourcing from fi rms within China, or 
multinationals move their upstream production to be near their down-
stream production, the extent of domestic content in exports rises over 
time. This is exactly what has happened since China joined the WTO. 
However, because exports from industries with relatively lower domes-
tic content often grow faster due to dramatic infl ow of foreign direct 
investment, the composition of a country’s total exports may play as 
an offsetting factor to reduce the share of DVA in the country’s gross 
exports and thus slow down the increase of DVA share in a country’s 
total exports. As the Chinese government starts to reduce the policy 
incentives for both FIEs and processing exports at the end of 2006, 
we are observing a trend of increasing domestic contents in Chinese 
exports as China continues its industrial upgrading in the years to come.
Our interpretation is confi rmed by DVA shares for processing and 
normal exports estimated separately (Table 2.9). There is a more than 
10 percentage point increase in the total FVA share for domestic sales 
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and normal exports between 1997 and 2007, which is consistent with 
the trend indicated by the HIY measure. However, in processing exports 
we see that more domestic-produced inputs were used, and DVA share 
increased from 20.7 percent in 1997 to 37.0 percent in 2007, up more 
than 16 percentage points. Because processing exports still constitute 
more than 50 percent of China’s total exports in 2007 the weighted 
average total DVA share went up over the decade. 
There are confl icting forces at work. On the one hand, as domes-
tic input suppliers increase their quality over time, and multinationals 
move more and more of their upstream production into China, export-
ing fi rms may decide to increase local sourcing of their inputs. On the 
other hand, the reductions in the country’s trade barriers also encourage 
exporting fi rms to use more imported inputs. These two opposing forces 
partially offset each other. However, on net, the domestic content share 
in China’s exports appears to be on the rise. Looking ahead, the share of 
imported content in exports could fall or rise, depending on the relative 
speed with which domestic input suppliers and multinationals can step 
Table 2.9  Domestic and Foreign Value Added: Processing vs. Normal 
Exports (% of total exports)
Normal exports Processing exports
1997 2002 2007 1997 2002 2007
All merchandise
Total foreign value added 5.2 10.4 16.0 79.0 74.6 62.7
Direct foreign value added 2.0 4.2 5.0 78.6 73.0 58.0
Total domestic value added 94.8 89.6 84.0 21.0 25.4 37.3
Direct domestic value added 35.1 31.9 23.4 11.7 10.1 10.9
Manufacturing goods only
Total foreign value added 5.5 11.0 16.4 79.4 75.2 63.0
Direct foreign value added 2.1 4.5 5.2 79.0 73.6 58.3
Total domestic value added 94.5 89.0 83.6 20.7 24.8 37.0
Direct domestic value added 31.5 29.5 22.4 11.7 10.0 10.9
SOURCE: Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008) and author’s estimates based on China’s 
1997, 2002, and 2007 benchmark input-output table published by the Bureau of 
National Statistics and Offi cial China trade statistics from China Customs.
NOTE: The HIY method refers to estimates from using the approach in Hummels, 
Ishii, and Yi (2001). The KWW method refers to estimates from using the approach 
developed in this paper that takes into account special features of processing exports. 
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up their quality and variety versus the extent of additional reductions in 
the cost of using imported inputs.
Sectoral results 
To see if there are interesting patterns at the sector level that help 
explain the decline trend of imported contents in China’s total exports, 
and further assess whether the increasing DVA share refl ects actual 
upgrade of Chinese industrial structure, Tables 2.10 and 2.11 report, in 
ascending order on domestic content share, the value-added decompo-
sition in China manufacturing exports by industry in 2002 and 2007, 
respectively, together with shares of processing and foreign invested 
enterprises exports in each sector’s exports as well as the sector’s share 
in China’s total merchandise exports. We choose to report the results 
from 2002 and 2007 not only because we would like to use the latest IO 
table released, but also because these two benchmark tables are consis-
tently classifi ed on most recent Chinese industry classifi cations, which 
simplifi es issues involved in overtime comparison. Similar results for 
1997 are omitted to save space. 
Among the 57 manufacturing industries in Table 2.10, 15 have a 
share of DVA in their exports less than 50 percent in 2002, and col-
lectively account for nearly 35 percent of China’s merchandise exports 
that year. Many low-DVA industries are likely to be labeled as rela-
tively sophisticated, such as telecommunications equipment, electronic 
computer, measuring instruments, and electronic devices. A common 
feature of these industries is that processing exports account for over 
two-thirds of their exports, and foreign-invested enterprises played an 
overwhelming role. In 2007, the number of industries with less than 
50 percent domestic contents in their exports declined to 10, but their 
exports accounted for more than 32 percent of China’s total merchan-
dise exports, and these low-DVA industries are more concentrated in 
high-tech sectors. There are 11 industries in the top 15 low-DVA indus-
tries in 2002 that maintained that ranking in 2007. 
The next 18 industries in Table 2.11 have their share of DVA in the 
range of 51–65 percent; they collectively accounted for 28 percent of 
China’s total merchandise exports in 2002. Several labor-intensive sec-
tors are in this group, such as furniture; toys and sports products; and 
leather, fur, and down products. 
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The remaining 24 industries have relatively high shares of DVA. 
However, as a group they produced less than 30 percent of China’s 
total merchandise exports in 2002. Apparel, the country’s largest labor-
intensive exporting industry, which by itself was responsible for 7 per-
cent of the country’s total merchandise exports in 2002, is at the top 
of this group with a share of domestic content at 66 percent. The 12 
industries at the bottom of Table 2.10 with DVA share more than 75 
percent collectively produced only less than 10 percent of China’s total 
merchandise exports in 2002. 
The weights of high-DVA industries in China’s exports increased 
signifi cantly in 2007. The number of industries with a DVA share of 
more than 75 percent increased to 25 in 2007 (bottom of Table 2.11), 
and their exports constituted more than 30 percent of China’s total 
merchandise exports in 2007. Among these high-DVA industries, we 
not only see the traditional labor industries such as furniture, textiles, 
and apparel still play a signifi cant role (they account for more than 
half of these high-DVA-sector exports), but also the increasing role of 
heavy and capital-intensive industries such as automobile, industrial 
machinery, and rolling steel (they account for nearly one-third of these 
high-DVA sector’s exports). The data clearly indicate China’s indus-
trial upgrade is real and FIEs have played a very important role in this 
process.  
The groundbreaking work by HIY (2001) on vertical specialization 
needs to be interpreted with care, particularly in countries that make 
extensive use of processing trade. We fi nd that for China the traditional 
HIY method substantially overestimated China’s domestic content in 
its exports and underestimated foreign content in its exports as in Table 
2.9. The HIY method estimates total DVA in Chinese exports ranging 
from 82 percent to 71 percent between 1997 and 2007, and that DVA 
was declining. The KWW method estimates that Chinese DVA ranged 
from 46 percent to 39 percent during this period, much lower than the 
HIY method, and that Chinese DVA was rising.
Further, with our method and data we could provide fairly detailed 
sectoral estimates of DVA in exports, as in Table 2.10. From this per-
spective you can observe that in 2002 China’s DVA in telecommunica-
tions, shipbuilding, and electronic computers was less than 20 percent 
of exported value. Many high-tech or sophisticated exports contained 
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Telecommunications equipment 12.6 87.5 94.7 5.3 87.5 12.5 91.2 88.4 3.2
Shipbuilding 17.7 82.3 85.3 14.7 82.5 17.5 95.8 21.0 0.6
Electronic computer 16.4 83.6 81.3 18.7 80.7 19.3 99.1 89.7 7.0
Cultural and offi ce equipment 20.3 79.7 80.7 19.3 76.7 23.3 93.4 71.6 4.3
Household electric appliances 11.8 88.2 93.2 6.8 76.2 23.9 79.1 56.9 1.9
Household audiovisual  apparatus 17.5 82.5 78.7 21.3 73.0 27.0 90.6 62.3 5.2
Printing, reproduction of recording media 8.9 91.1 80.3 19.7 68.1 31.9 83.0 62.7 0.3
Plastic 15.6 84.4 89.7 10.3 63.4 36.6 64.5 51.2 2.4
Electronic components 15.4 84.6 67.2 32.8 61.9 38.1 89.7 87.5 3.4
Steelmaking 11.0 89.0 87.2 12.8 55.8 44.3 58.8 86.1 0.0
Generators 14.8 85.2 68.1 32.0 55.7 44.3 76.8 55.8 0.9
Other electronic and communication 
equipment
2.2 97.8 64.0 36.0 54.7 45.3 84.9 84.9 1.8
Rubber 9.4 90.6 87.8 12.2 51.1 48.9 53.1 44.4 1.6
Nonferrous metal pressing 13.8 86.2 92.5 7.5 50.7 49.3 46.9 48.7 0.4
Measuring instruments 14.2 85.8 67.1 32.9 50.5 49.5 68.6 51.8 1.8
Paper and paper products 9.2 90.8 87.6 12.4 48.9 51.1 50.7 57.0 0.5
Furniture 11.7 88.3 87.5 12.5 47.5 52.5 47.2 56.8 1.7
Articles for culture, education, and sports 
activities
12.5 87.5 61.8 38.2 47.3 52.7 70.6 56.3 3.3
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Nonferrous metal smelting 11.1 88.9 89.4 10.6 46.4 53.6 45.0 17.4 0.8
Smelting of ferroalloy 16.5 83.6 87.1 13.0 45.2 54.8 40.8 13.1 0.2
Synthetic materials 19.5 80.5 62.9 37.1 44.8 55.2 58.3 65.4 0.3
Petroleum refi ning and nuclear fuel 20.6 79.4 94.5 5.5 44.3 55.7 32.1 24.9 0.8
Metal products 9.7 90.3 89.8 10.2 44.3 55.7 43.2 45.6 4.4
Other transport equipment 14.0 86.0 87.3 12.7 44.2 55.8 41.2 50.5 1.2
Other electric machinery and equipment 11.6 88.4 59.9 40.1 43.9 56.2 66.8 60.1 5.6
Special chemical products 17.1 82.9 68.6 31.4 41.3 58.7 46.9 48.4 0.8
Other manufacturing products 10.8 89.2 68.7 31.3 41.0 59.0 52.2 37.6 1.7
Woolen textiles 8.9 91.1 91.2 8.8 40.0 60.1 37.8 42.6 0.3
Paints, printing inks, pigments, and 
similar products
16.5 83.5 91.7 8.3 38.4 61.6 29.1 44.4 0.4
Motor vehicles 10.5 89.6 90.0 10.0 38.4 61.6 35.2 48.2 0.8
Glass and its products 13.2 86.8 83.5 16.5 36.4 63.6 33.0 48.8 0.5
Leather, fur, down, and related products 8.1 91.9 59.7 40.4 36.1 63.9 54.3 50.3 4.5
Chemical products for daily use 14.7 85.3 73.2 26.8 36.0 64.1 36.3 43.6 0.4
Wearing apparel 8.7 91.3 65.7 34.3 34.4 65.6 45.1 39.2 7.0
Chemical fi ber 19.8 80.2 90.8 9.2 34.3 65.7 20.5 29.2 0.0
Other special industrial equipment 10.8 89.3 68.0 32.0 33.6 66.4 39.9 44.0 1.3
Boilers, engines, and turbines 14.1 85.9 86.9 13.1 33.5 66.5 26.7 28.4 0.4
Other industrial machinery 9.9 90.1 61.4 38.6 32.4 67.6 43.7 43.7 3.5
Iron-smelting 13.2 86.8 89.0 11.0 31.2 68.8 23.7 3.0 0.1
Railroad transport equipment 16.2 83.9 85.4 14.6 29.9 70.1 19.9 5.9 0.1
Wood, bamboo, rattan, palm, and straw 
products
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Knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles 9.4 90.6 65.3 34.7 27.1 72.9 31.6 34.2 5.8
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, 
and fi shing machinery
14.3 85.7 86.1 13.9 27.1 72.9 17.8 20.8 0.1
Pesticides 23.0 77.0 88.5 11.5 27.1 72.9 6.3 14.4 0.2
Hemp textiles 10.5 89.5 88.3 11.7 25.7 74.3 19.5 19.5 0.3
Textiles productions 9.9 90.1 71.1 28.9 24.6 75.5 24.0 31.8 1.4
Cotton textiles 8.2 91.8 64.5 35.6 24.3 75.7 28.7 28.8 3.3
Fire-resistant materials 9.5 90.5 84.6 15.4 23.8 76.2 19.1 49.8 0.1
Metalworking machinery 12.8 87.2 81.2 18.8 21.9 78.1 13.3 27.0 0.2
Medicines 9.8 90.2 75.7 24.3 20.9 79.1 16.9 28.7 0.7
Pottery and porcelain 11.8 88.2 85.3 14.8 20.2 79.8 11.4 33.1 0.7
Other non-metallic mineral products 9.6 90.4 83.3 16.7 19.9 80.1 14.0 35.7 0.4
Fertilizers 15.6 84.4 90.3 9.7 18.9 81.1 4.5 21.7 0.1
Basic chemical raw materials 12.9 87.1 56.3 43.7 18.0 82.0 11.7 18.8 2.0
Rolling of steel 9.8 90.2 59.5 40.5 17.7 82.3 16.0 16.8 0.3
Cement, lime, and plaster 9.0 91.0 79.8 20.3 14.0 86.0 7.0 77.7 0.1
Coking 8.6 91.4 86.8 13.2 10.6 89.4 2.6 5.3 0.3
Total merchandise 10.4 89.6 74.6 25.4 46.1 53.9 55.7 51.8 92.5
SOURCE: Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008). China 2002 and 2007 benchmark IO tables have 84 and 90 goods-producing sectors respec-
tively; they both concord to China’s 4 digit classifi cation of economic activities (GB/T 4754-2002). This concordance enabled us to 
aggregate both year’s estimates to 77 consistent goods-producing industries reported in this table.
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less than 40 percent of Chinese domestic content. On the other hand, 
many of China’s historical export sectors, such as apparel, textiles and 
fabrics, and many steel or metal-related items, had domestic content in 
excess of 60 percent. These estimates suggest that studies that examine 
extraordinary sophistication of China’s exports, such as that by Rodrik 
(2006) and Schott (2008), might need to be interpreted with some care, 
as this sophistication may refl ect the embodiment of sophisticated 
imported components. Further, if the domestic content in exports from 
China is low, especially in sectors that would have been considered 
sophisticated or high-skilled in the United States, then imports from 
the PRC may still generate a large downward pressure on the wage 
of the low-skilled Americans after all (as pointed out by Krugman 
[2008]). These are important policy questions and have implications 
for both developing and developed countries. A good understanding of 
the nature and extent of global supply chains could provide important 
insights for economists and policymakers.
The work we did on China, similar work for Mexico (De La Cruz 
et al. 2010), and a growing literature on value added in trade led us to 
develop a method to look at global value added trade, while incorporat-
ing the insights we developed for large single country traders making 
heavy use of processing. Thus, in Koopman et al. (2010) we develop 
an estimation technique designed to tie, at a global level, value-added 
estimates to gross trade fl ows, which is the most commonly available 
trade data and is heavily used to support various policy positions. Thus 
we use IO techniques to examine global value chain links using gross 
exports as a weighting mechanism. In this chapter we fully character-
ized value-added contributions from direct and indirect sources in a 
country’s gross exports, formally generalizing the concept of verti-
cal specialization to account for all sources of value added in gross 
exports in a multicountry, multisector framework. It also connects the 
vertical trade literature with value-added trade literature, generalizing 
concepts such as DVA that returns home in goods and services after 
being processed or fi nished abroad, denoted VS1* by Daudin, Riffl art, 
and Schweisguth (2009). This measure can be sizable for some large 
advanced economies.
To do this, we fi rst divide gross exports into fi nal demand and inter-
mediates. Within intermediates, we further divide those goods that are 
consumed by the direct importer from those goods that are processed 
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Electronic component 22.5 77.5 76.9 23.1 67.7 32.3 83.1 89.8 4.9
Household audiovisual  apparatus 24.1 75.9 70.4 29.6 67.4 32.6 93.4 79.1 2.5
Electronic computer 24.3 75.7 67.1 33.0 66.2 33.9 97.9 93.3 11.3
Cultural and offi ce equipment 25.9 74.1 66.9 33.1 63.5 36.5 91.7 86.4 1.6
Other electronic and communication equip. 32.0 68.0 65.3 34.7 60.3 39.7 84.8 81.6 1.4
Telecommunications equipment 24.8 75.2 64.7 35.3 56.4 43.6 79.3 83.6 5.9
Shipbuilding 16.1 83.9 60.9 39.1 56.2 43.8 89.4 16.5 1.1
Petroleum refi ning and nuclear fuel 31.3 68.7 79.9 20.1 55.6 44.4 50.1 27.3 0.7
Measuring instruments 20.0 80.0 62.2 37.8 54.2 45.8 81.2 73.3 2.5
Synthetic materials 23.6 76.4 66.1 34.0 52.4 47.7 67.7 66.1 0.6
Household electric appliances 18.0 82.0 64.4 35.6 48.2 51.8 65.1 61.7 2.7
Other electric machinery and equipment 19.7 80.3 66.3 33.7 47.9 52.1 60.5 65.9 4.9
Rubber 18.3 81.8 73.0 27.0 46.7 53.4 51.8 41.9 1.7
Plastic 19.2 80.8 68.9 31.1 44.9 55.1 51.7 54.7 1.7
Articles for culture, education, and sports 
activities
17.0 83.0 54.4 45.6 41.7 58.4 66.0 64.9 2.1
Special chemical products 23.3 76.7 66.0 34.0 38.4 61.6 35.3 51.2 0.8
Chemical fi ber 23.6 76.4 48.1 51.9 37.4 62.6 56.2 48.7 0.3
Other special industrial equipment 17.5 82.5 57.0 43.0 34.8 65.2 43.8 54.7 2.7
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Generators 19.7 80.3 48.8 51.2 33.4 66.6 47.2 50.3 0.7
Railroad transport equipment 22.3 77.7 45.9 54.1 31.0 69.0 37.0 12.2 0.1
Leather, fur, down, and related products 9.6 90.4 59.6 40.4 30.8 69.2 42.5 46.0 2.4
Paper and paper products 14.5 85.5 42.4 57.6 30.8 69.2 58.4 62.8 0.4
Metal products 15.0 85.1 60.4 39.7 29.9 70.1 32.9 49.5 4.4
Boilers, engines, and turbines 18.4 81.6 61.3 38.7 29.4 70.6 25.6 37.8 0.5
Nonferrous metal pressing 21.4 78.6 43.9 56.1 28.8 71.2 32.7 41.4 1.0
Other manufacturing products 13.5 86.5 52.0 48.1 27.7 72.3 36.8 41.5 1.6
Paints, printing inks, pigments, and similar 
products
23.5 76.5 43.2 56.8 27.5 72.6 20.1 47.3 0.3
Pesticides 26.1 73.9 46.5 53.6 27.1 72.9 4.8 19.5 0.1
Chemical products for daily use 19.2 80.8 41.6 58.4 26.7 73.3 33.5 55.5 0.3
Nonferrous metal smelting 23.8 76.2 43.6 56.4 26.7 73.3 14.6 19.6 0.8
Other transport equipment 19.0 81.0 45.1 54.9 26.2 73.8 27.8 46.5 0.9
Basic chemical raw materials 19.2 80.8 57.5 42.5 25.1 74.9 15.6 26.4 1.9
Motor vehicles 16.0 84.0 52.6 47.4 24.7 75.3 23.7 42.0 2.0
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, 
and fi shing machinery
19.4 80.6 42.3 57.7 24.4 75.6 21.9 32.7 0.1
Other industrial machinery 16.5 83.6 43.8 56.2 24.4 75.6 29.0 49.9 3.4
Iron-smelting 24.1 75.9 49.4 50.6 24.4 75.6 1.1 24.3 0.1
Smelting of ferroalloy 24.3 75.7 46.7 53.3 24.4 75.6 0.4 8.8 0.4
Furniture 13.3 86.7 43.9 56.1 23.8 76.2 34.2 56.0 2.0
Printing, reproduction of recording media 13.6 86.4 39.0 61.0 23.5 76.5 39.0 44.4 0.2
Glass and its products 16.7 83.3 41.0 59.0 23.3 76.7 27.2 46.4 0.6
Woolen textiles 10.6 89.4 42.2 57.9 23.1 76.9 39.8 46.8 0.2
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Metalworking machinery 18.8 81.2 43.2 56.8 22.7 77.3 16.0 36.4 0.3
Rolling of steel 20.0 80.0 47.2 52.9 22.2 77.8 8.3 22.6 3.8
Fertilizers 19.0 81.0 42.7 57.3 22.1 77.9 13.2 9.5 0.3
Cotton textiles 12.0 88.0 54.3 45.8 21.1 78.9 21.5 26.1 2.1
Wearing apparel 10.5 89.5 46.1 53.9 21.0 79.0 29.7 36.9 4.6
Medicines 12.4 87.6 62.5 37.5 19.7 80.3 14.5 32.3 0.8
Wood, bamboo, rattan, palm, and straw 
products
15.4 84.6 41.7 58.4 19.6 80.4 16.1 33.1 1.0
Steelmaking 19.2 80.8 48.3 51.7 19.2 80.8 0.2 7.1 0.3
Pottery and porcelain 16.6 83.4 41.9 58.2 18.0 82.0 5.2 29.9 0.5
Textiles productions 11.6 88.4 45.1 54.9 17.6 82.4 18.1 35.1 1.8
Knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles 11.8 88.2 48.4 51.6 17.5 82.5 15.6 25.7 5.7
Other non-metallic mineral products 14.0 86.0 43.4 56.6 17.0 83.0 10.1 25.1 0.5
Hemp textiles 13.4 86.6 43.2 56.8 16.1 83.9 9.0 14.7 0.2
Fire-resistant materials 13.5 86.6 44.9 55.1 15.3 84.7 5.8 51.6 0.1
Cement, lime, and plaster 11.0 89.0 47.1 52.9 11.6 88.4 1.7 29.6 0.1
Coking 10.4 89.6 10.4 89.6 0.0 11.4 0.3
Total merchandise 16.0 84.0 62.7 37.3 39.4 60.6 50.1 55.7 96.0
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. China 2002 and 2007 benchmark IO tables have 84 and 90 goods-producing sector, respectively; they 
both concord to China’s 4 digit classifi cation of economic activities (GB/T 4754-2002). This concordance enables us to aggregate both 
years’ estimates to 77 consistent goods-producing industries reported in this table.
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and exported by the direct importer for consumption or further process-
ing in a third country:




Final goods Intermediates Processed andProcessed and exported
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where Xst is the output of country s used to produce goods absorbed in 
country t. Note that the last three terms sum to the bilateral gross trade 
in intermediate goods, and each may include both intermediates and 
fi nal products produced in the importing country s. 
In Koopman et al. (2010), we transform the above equation to arrive 
at our key decomposition equation that states that a country’s gross 
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 (1)  DVA embodied in exports of fi nal goods and services absorbed 
by the direct importer,
 (2)  DVA embodied in exports of intermediate inputs used by the 
direct importer to produce its domestically needed products,
 (3)  DVA embodied in intermediate exports used by the direct 
importer to produce goods for third countries (indirect value-
added exports),
 (4)  DVA embodied in intermediate exports used by the direct 
importer to produce goods shipped back to source (refl ected 
DVA), and
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 (5)  value added from foreign countries embodied in gross exports 
(FVA used in exports).
This decomposition formula is also shown in Figure 2.10, which 
integrates the older literature on vertical specialization with the newer 
literature on value-added trade, while ensuring that measured value 
added from all sources accounts for total gross exports. The vertical spe-
cialization literature emphasized that gross exports contain two sources 
of value added, domestic and foreign. The second equation above shows 
that a country’s DVA could be further broken down into additional com-
ponents that reveal the destination of a country’s exported value added, 
including its own value added that returns home in its imports.9 The 
sum of (1), (2), and (3) equals each country’s value-added exports to 
the world; the sum of (1), (2), (3), and (4) equals domestic content in a 
country’s gross exports, thus nicely connecting the two major concepts 
in the vertical specialization and value-added trade literature on the one 
hand, and clearly distinguishing them on the other hand. 
In addition, all other measures in the literature can be derived from 
a combination of the fi ve basic measures. For instance, the sum of (3) 
and (4) equals HIY’s VS1 in gross exports; the sum of (1), (2), and (3)
divided by gross exports equals Johnson and Noguera’s (2010) ratio 
of value-added exports to gross exports (VAX ratio); and the sum of 
(4) and (5) equals the portion of trade that is double counted in offi cial 
trade statistics.10
In Table 2.12 we report the global decomposition by country or 
regional grouping in our database for 2004 and map it back to the exist-
ing measures in the literature. An interesting insight reported in the 
table is our estimate of the double or multiple counting (column 9) in 
global trade fl ows as a result of value added moving across multiple 
borders. We estimate that the global average is 25.6 percent. One can 
observe a number of interesting insights from this global approach. We 
can see that some countries, such as Japan, Indonesia, and the Phil-
ippines, are important intermediate suppliers, providing indirect value 
added through their exports to third countries. Some countries such 
as Brazil, Russia, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand export a lot of 
value-added intermediates that are consumed by the direct importer. 
Another interesting insight is that the EU and the United States have a 
much greater share of their DVA exports return home to them embed-
ded in other countries’ exports. 
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This global approach also allows us to provide interesting policy-
relevant insights that otherwise might not have been evident. For exam-
ple, in the USITC’s recent study (2011) we provide insights on U.S. 
trade using value-added trade data.11 Although U.S. imports from China 
and Mexico are considerable, these countries contribute less value 
added to U.S. imports than Europe, Canada, and Japan, the three larg-
est contributors to value added (Table 2.13). Remarkably, U.S. value 
added that returns home after receiving further processing elsewhere 
ranks fourth, at 8.3 percent. Among all countries, the United States has 
the highest share of its own value-added exports returned home in its 
Figure 2.10  Decomposition of Gross Exports: Concepts
Exported in 


































NOTE: (4) is also labeled as VS1* by Daudin et al. (2009). (5) is labeled as VS, and (3) 
+ (4) is labeled as VS1 by HIY (2001). (4) and (5) involve value added that crosses 
national borders at least twice, and are the sources of multiple counting of value added 
in standard trade statistics. The share of domestic content in a country’s exports equals 
(1) + (2) + (3) + (4). (1) + (2) is the VAX ratio for each country’s exports to the world 
defi ned by Johnson and Noguera (2010).
SOURCE: Koopman et al. (2010).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Advanced economies         
Australia, New Zealand 27.0 33.6 27.4 0.6 11.5 88.0 27.9 88.5 12.0 39.4
Canada 23.5 36.2 10.9 1.3 28.1 70.5 12.2 71.9 29.5 40.4
EFTA 23.0 36.3 14.7 0.8 25.2 74.0 15.5 74.8 26.0 40.8
EU 38.1 29.6 13.5 7.4 11.4 81.1 20.9 88.6 18.9 32.3
Japan 38.4 18.5 28.0 2.9 12.2 84.9 30.8 87.8 15.1 43.1
United States 32.5 27.6 14.6 12.4 12.9 74.6 27.0 87.1 25.4 39.9
Asian NICs         
Hong Kong 27.2 25.8 18.9 0.6 27.5 71.9 19.5 72.5 28.1 47.0
Korea 29.5 13.5 22.3 0.9 33.9 65.2 23.2 66.1 34.8 57.0
Taiwan 19.2 12.6 26.4 0.8 41.1 58.2 27.1 58.9 41.8 68.2
Singapore 11.0 13.1 12.2 0.6 63.2 36.3 12.8 36.8 63.7 76.0
Emerging Asia
China normal 44.2 20.3 19.7 1.2 14.6 84.2 20.9 85.4 15.8 35.5
China processing 28.8 10.2 4.1 0.3 56.6 43.1 4.4 43.4 56.9 61.0
Indonesia 20.0 28.1 28.4 0.6 22.9 76.5 29.0 77.1 23.5 51.9
Malaysia 16.7 17.7 24.1 0.9 40.5 58.6 25.0 59.5 41.4 65.5
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Philippines 17.6 11.1 29.0 0.4 41.9 57.8 29.4 58.1 42.2 71.2
Thailand 27.9 14.0 18.1 0.3 39.7 60.0 18.5 60.3 40.0 58.1
Vietnam 32.9 15.3 14.4 0.4 37.0 62.6 14.8 63.0 37.4 51.8
Rest of East Asia 35.3 26.9 16.1 0.1 21.7 78.2 16.2 78.3 21.8 37.9
India 30.2 30.8 18.6 0.4 20.1 79.6 18.9 79.9 20.4 39.0
Rest of South Asia 48.8 19.2 10.6 0.1 21.3 78.6 10.7 78.7 21.4 32.0
Other emerging 
Brazil 27.4 40.7 19.0 0.3 12.7 87.0 19.2 87.3 13.0 31.9
EU accession countries 28.7 29.2 10.4 1.0 30.8 68.3 11.4 69.2 31.7 42.1
Mexico normal 23.5 41.1 17.4 0.6 17.3 82.1 18.1 82.7 17.9 35.3
Mexico processing 20.6 10.1 5.6 0.3 63.4 36.3 5.9 36.7 63.7 69.3
Rest of Americas 23.8 40.6 20.4 0.7 14.4 84.9 21.2 85.6 15.2 35.6
Russian Federation 9.5 49.1 30.5 0.7 10.2 89.1 31.2 89.8 10.9 41.4
South Africa 23.1 34.5 24.0 0.2 18.2 81.6 24.2 81.8 18.4 42.4
Rest of the world 15.0 45.6 22.4 2.5 14.6 83.0 24.9 85.4 17.0 39.5
World average 29.2 27.7 17.5 4.0 21.5 74.4 21.5 78.5 25.6 43.0
a Data from Johnson and Noguera (2010).
b Data from Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001).
NOTE: All columns are expressed as a share of total gross exports. DVA = domestic value added. Country groupings follow IMF regions 
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/groups.htm#oem).
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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imports.12 This high share refl ects both the large size of the U.S. market 
and its tight integration with Canada and Mexico.
The value-added approach more accurately portrays the origin of the 
value in U.S. imports than can standard gross import data. For example, 
Japan has an 8.7 percent share of total U.S. imports, but accounts for 
10.4 percent of the value added in U.S. imports. Japan’s higher share 
of value-added imports indicates that a substantial share of its exports 
(26 percent) fi rst journey to other countries and undergo additional pro-
cessing before being exported to the United States. Specifi cally, Japan 
produces a large volume of high-value components that are shipped 
to other Asian countries, particularly China, where they are assembled 
into consumer goods and then exported (Dean, Lovely, and Mora 2009). 
In contrast, China’s share of U.S. value-added imports (7.7 percent) is 
less than its share of total U.S. imports (11.1 percent). China is the fi nal 
assembler in a number of supply chains in which Japan and other coun-
tries in East Asia supply parts. Similarly, exports from many smaller 
East Asian countries pass through third countries, such as China, before 
entering the United States. Canada and Mexico also have lower shares 
of U.S. value-added imports than their total U.S. imports. U.S. imports 
from Canada and Mexico contain many U.S.-produced components, 
which contribute to the large share of U.S. exported value that returns 
home. Obviously understanding the underlying geographic composi-
tion of value added in imports can ensure a deeper understanding of a 
large number of policy issues, such as FTA negotiations, supply chain 
disruptions, and the impact of currency revaluations. 
Various countries and regions contribute value to U.S. imports in 
different sectors (Table 2.14). Europe is the largest source of value 
added for many sectors, particularly business services. U.S.-returned 
value added is most signifi cant in motor vehicles and parts (19.1 per-
cent); much of this represents value added returned home from other 
NAFTA countries, as the United States is heavily involved in auto sup-
ply chains in this region. Europe and Japan also contribute signifi cant 
amounts of value added to U.S. imports of motor vehicles and parts. 
U.S.-returned value added is also fairly high for apparel (11.0 percent), 
since some rules of origin provide for duty-free imports of apparel 
made from U.S. yarns and fabrics. East Asia, which has abundant low-
cost labor and is well integrated into supply chains with China, contrib-
uted the most value added to U.S. imports of apparel (27.8 percent).13 
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Share of value-added passing 
through a third country before 
entering the United States (%)
Europe 393,301 24.7 26.1 17.6
Canada 242,170 15.2 11.0 3.2
Japan 138,417 8.7 10.4 26.0
United States — 0.0 8.3 100.0
China 176,879 11.1 7.7 14.8
Mexico 154,571 9.7 4.9 4.0
Rest of Americasa 76,183 4.8 4.7 13.2
Developing East Asia 79,250 5.0 4.5 32.4
Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong 73,066 4.6 4.3 36.7
Korea 51,707 3.3 3.3 31.8
Brazil 23,662 1.5 1.6 20.3
Australia and New Zealand 15,717 1.0 1.3 33.6
Russia 12,003 0.8 1.3 46.4
India 17,486 1.1 1.1 22.0
South Asia 9,557 0.6 0.5 10.2
Rest of world 120,320 7.6 8.5 23.5
Total 1,590,124 100.0 100.0 25.8b
aIncluding South American, Central American, and Caribbean countries other than Mexico and Brazil.
bU.S. average, weighted by U.S. imports from all sources.
SOURCE: Commission estimates. Table 3.2 in the USITC study.
68  Table 2.14  Country or Regional Sources of Value Added on U.S. Imports, Selected Sectors, 2004 (%)
Sector
            U.S 
             returned China Japan East Asia Canada Mexico
Latin 
America Europe Others
Total 8.3 7.7 10.4 12.0 11.0 4.9 6.3 26.1 13.2
Selected sectors
Apparel 11.0 11.2 2.4 27.8 2.4 2.0 10.4 11.4 21.4
Chemicals, rubber, and plastics 6.3 5.0 9.7 8.7 12.0 2.5 3.6 42.8 9.4
Motor vehicles and parts 19.1 2.5 23.0 7.2 16.0 3.8 1.9 23.1 3.4
Electronic equipment 8.6 14.4 19.0 29.6 2.4 9.3 1.3 11.4 3.9
Machinery and equipment 11.3 10.1 17.2 9.7 6.9 4.7 2.9 32.1 5.1
Business services 1.5 1.3 6.2 12.7 8.8 0.2 2.7 55.5 11.3
SOURCE: Commission estimates from USITC (2008, Table 3.3).
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Sectoral insights on value-added imports can again inform FTA nego-
tiations, provide insights on supply chain disruptions, and help identify 
potential indirect effects of protection measures. 
The value-added shares of U.S. absorption (i.e., the use of interme-
diate inputs plus consumption of fi nal products, or equivalently total 
domestic expenditures on goods and services) provide another view of 
the sectors and regions where global value chains are important to the 
U.S. economy. Absorption can distinguish the relative U.S. and FVA 
shares in products consumed in the United States. Overall, the United 
States itself generates a large share (89 percent) of the value of fi nal and 
intermediate goods that it uses (Table 2.15). This share is on par with 
those of Japan (90 percent) and the EU-15 (88 percent), and is higher 
than those of most developing countries.14 The many goods and ser-
vices produced and consumed in the United States and the large portion 
of U.S. value returned in imports contribute to the high share.
Although overall U.S. value in absorption is high, the domestic 
value share is typically lower for sectors actively involved in global 
supply chains. There is substantial foreign content in electronic equip-
ment, apparel, and motor vehicles. For apparel, consistent with value 
added in imports, China and East Asia contribute more value to U.S. 
absorption than Mexico and Latin America (largely from Central Amer-
ica). Japan, Canada, and Europe are major participants in supply chains 
for motor vehicles and parts, and together account for almost one-third 
of the value added in U.S. absorption in the sector. Japan, East Asia, 
Mexico, and Europe participate in the supply chain for electronic equip-
ment, which is one of the largest in terms of the number of countries 
contributing signifi cant value added. Electronics has the highest share 
of foreign content: fully two-thirds of the value of all electronics prod-
ucts used by U.S. industry and consumers originates abroad. Hence, 
foreign value in some U.S. industries may be substantially higher than 
estimates in previous studies based on gross input use or gross trade. 
In business services, a category that includes consulting and com-
puter support, the United States provides a large portion (88.5 percent) 
of its absorbed value added, while Europe contributes 5.9 percent. 
Despite the high profi le of India’s consulting and computer services 
and the prominence of some large suppliers, India supplied only 0.1 
percent of the value added in U.S. absorption of business services in 
2004, though this may have risen in recent years.
70  Table 2.15  Country or Regional Sources of Value Added in U.S. Absorption, Selected Sectors, 2004 (%)
Sector U.S. China Japan East Asia Canada Mexico
Latin 
America Europe Others
Total 89.0 0.9 1.3 1.5 1.3 0.6 0.7 3.2 1.4
Selected sectors
Apparel 54.3 4.1 0.6 18.3 2.1 1.8 5.7 2.9 8.6
Chemicals, rubber, and plastics 69.1 3.1 4.2 4.2 3.4 0.8 1.4 11.9 1.5
Motor vehicles and parts 57.3 1.5 11.3 3.4 10.1 4.6 0.6 10.6 0.5
Electronic equipment 33.3 9.3 12.7 23.3 1.8 10.9 0.8 7.0 0.8
Machinery and equipment 76.1 2.7 4.5 3.1 2.2 1.6 0.7 8.4 0.6
Business services 88.5 0.3 1.4 1.1 1.4 0.0 0.5 5.9 0.8
SOURCE: Commission estimates from USITC (2008, Table 3.4).
Value Chains in Global Production Networks   71
In addition, the U.S. trade balance is a frequently discussed trade 
issue. The United States has had large trade defi cits in recent years (e.g., 
$500 billion in 2010), and it has also had substantial bilateral defi cits 
with major trading partners. The value-added trade work discussed 
here, and in the literature more broadly, has demonstrated that many 
countries may add value to a particular good or service in a global sup-
ply chain, and that attributing the entire export value to the last export-
ing country can provide a misleading picture of the sources of value in 
trade. While the overall trade balance is not affected by value-added 
calculations, examinations of bilateral trade balances on a value-added 
basis yield different conclusions about the extent to which specifi c for-
eign countries contribute to a country’s defi cit, and here we will focus 
on the U.S. defi cit. 
The contribution of China to the U.S. trade defi cit differs substan-
tially depending on which of the two measures is used. China is often 
the fi nal assembler in a large number of global supply chains, and it 
uses components from many other countries to produce its exports. In 
Figure 2.11 we see that the U.S.-China trade defi cit on a value-added 
basis is considerably smaller (by about 40 percent in 2004) than on 
the commonly reported basis of offi cial gross trade.15 In contrast, Japan 
exports parts and components to countries throughout Asia, many of 
which are eventually assembled into fi nal products and exported to the 
United States. Thus the U.S.-Japan trade balance on a value-added basis 
is larger than the comparable gross trade defi cit. The U.S. value-added 
trade defi cits with other major trading partners (Canada, Mexico, and 
the EU-15) differ by smaller amounts from their corresponding gross 
trade defi cits.
There is signifi cant political debate in the United States regarding 
efforts to encourage China to appreciate the Renminbi (RMB) faster. 
The logic behind this argument is that if the RMB were to unilaterally 
appreciate by 30 percent, then Chinese export prices will increase by 
30 percent, raising prices in the United States of Chinese products and 
reducing U.S. demand for those imported products. Apparently expec-
tations are that U.S. consumers would then buy other, U.S-made prod-
ucts, or production of those products would shift back to the United 
States, and/or U.S. consumers would decide to save the money they oth-
erwise would have spent, resulting in an overall decline in U.S. imports. 
Furthermore, a number of commentators have suggested that such an 
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appreciation could raise U.S. employment anywhere from 600,000 to 
2.3 million additional jobs.16 
However, unilateral RMB appreciation will likely raise the costs of 
Chinese content, or value added, in its exports. Thus, if Chinese value 
added for electronics products is 15 percent of its exports prices, then 
a 30 percent appreciation of the RMB could raise the price of Chinese 
electronics products by only 4.5 percent, not 30 percent. Of course, his-
torically, exchange rate pass through has typically been much less than 
1.0, perhaps because of value-added content related issues, but also 
because of competitive pricing decisions by exporters who may absorb 
some of the increase. Further, it appears more likely that U.S. consum-
ers would continue to demand similar products, probably imported from 
some other international supplier, at a higher price, though perhaps 
priced in a different currency. An excellent overview of these issues can 
be found in Arnold (2008). Thus, with a more in-depth understanding 
Figure 2.11  U.S. Bilateral Trade Defi cits with Major Trading Partners, 
2004
SOURCE: Commission estimates from USITC (2008, box 3.4)
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of value-added trade, one can better understand the potential impact on 
country-specifi c export prices based on a currency appreciation.
Another insight gained from value-added trade is correcting a fairly 
standard, though potentially misleading, measure of export’s contribu-
tion to GDP growth. In Figure 2.12 we see that export growth as a share 
of GDP is not necessarily a good indicator of GDP growth, as Mexico, 
a country with a relatively high ratio of export to GDP, has had mixed 
GDP growth over the period, while countries such as Brazil and India, 
with relatively low shares of export to GDP growth, are experiencing 
rather robust and extensive economic growth. McKinsey researchers 
illustrated that export growth’s contribution to economic growth in 
China using traditional GDP growth decomposition methods was very 
misleading (Horn, Singer, and Woetzel 2010). Using traditional meth-
ods suggests that exports contributed 40–60 percent of China’s eco-
nomic growth from 1990 to 2008; however, they recalculate China’s 
GDP growth for 2002–2007, 2008, and 2009, adopt the KWW (2008) 
method, and fi nd that exports contributed 14–27 percent of overall GDP 






















Mexico: high ratio of exports to GDP, but 
mediocre economic growth
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growth and that the role of investment and private consumption are sub-
stantially more important. Economists generally view sustained eco-
nomic growth as being driven by investment and consumption growth 
on the demand side. 
In sum, the fact that we can now generate single country and global 
value-added trade databases now allows the insights generated from a 
vast array of product-specifi c value and supply chain case studies to 
be translated into more aggregated data tied to traditional measures of 
global trade. The ability to combine product level case studies with sec-
tor and country level data is a major step forward in our efforts to more 
accurately inform policymakers about the impacts and implications of 
trade and trade policy.
Notes
The contributions of Zhi Wang, Shang-Jin Wei, and Justino De La Cruz are greatly 
appreciated; however, any and all remaining errors in this paper are mine. The views 
expressed here are solely those of the author and do not refl ect the views of the U.S. 
International Trade Commission or any of its commissioners.
  1. For a more extensive discussion on these issues see, for example, Fosler and 
Bottelier (2007) and Branstetter and Lardy (2006).
  2.  Ahearne et al. (2007) presents a nice summary. 
  3. See Hammer (2006) for extensive discussions on driving factors in U.S-China 
trade and Yao (2008) for a similar discussion on trade between China and the 
world.   
  4. This section is drawn from U.S. Trade Shifts found at http://www.usitc.gov/
tradeshifts/2007/default.htm (accessed June 27, 2012).
  5. This is a very abbreviated summary of the U.S.-China trade relationship. For more 
detailed discussions of U.S.-China and China-world trade patterns, see Hammer 
(2006) and Yao (2008).
  6. See, for example, testimony from C. Fred Bergsten, of the Peterson Institute of 
International Economics, before the Hearing on China’s Exchange Rate Policy, 
Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, September 
15, 2012. http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/transcript/9854.html#trumka 
(accessed June 27, 2012).
  7. China’s trade-weighted tariff rate refl ects the relatively high tariffs remaining 
on imports of textiles and apparel. In fact, China’s declining average tariff rate 
over the period in the table refl ects more of the changing composition of China’s 
exports increasingly toward products in lower tariff lines as found in HS 84. 
  8. De La Cruz et al. (2010); Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2010); and Powers et al. 
(2010) are among some of the papers generated from this effort. In the following 
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discussions on value-added trade in China and for global value added estimates, I 
draw heavily from sections of Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008) and Koopman et 
al. (2010).
  9. Since Equation (16) decomposes all bilateral exports from country s to country r, 
it also simultaneously decomposes bilateral imports. 
 10. Component (3) should not be included in double counting because when this value 
crosses a border the second time, it becomes foreign value in the direct impor-
ter’s exports. For this reason, it is not included as double counting to avoid an 
overcorrection.
  11. The discussion surrounding Tables 2.12, 2.13, and 2.14 draws heavily on USITC 
(2011).
  12. The world average is 4.0 percent. Other economies with high shares include the 
EU (7.2 percent) and Japan (3.4 percent) (Koopman et al. 2010).
  13. Major changes have occurred in global supply chains involving textiles and 
apparel since 2004, and China’s prominence in U.S. imports has likely increased. 
  14. EU-15 refers to the fi rst 15 countries to join the EU. DVA shares for Japan, the 
EU-15, and other countries come from Koopman et al. (2010).
  15. Using a slightly different method, a recent study by the WTO and the Institute of 
Developing Economies–Japan External Trade Organization (2011) fi nds that this 
discrepancy was about 53 percent in 2005 and 42 percent in 2008. Johnson and 
Noguera (2010) have roughly similar results also, though in their estimates the 
bilateral U.S. defi cit with Mexico reversed to a surplus.
  16. Bergsten (2010) estimates between 600,000 and 1.2 million jobs from a substan-
tial appreciation, Krugman (2010) estimates the effect at 1.4 million jobs, and 
Scott (2010) estimates 2.3 million jobs with a return of the bilateral defi cit to 2001 
levels. It has been diffi cult to reproduce employment impacts like this using stan-
dard USITC general equilibrium models, even when we restrict the model to force 
substitution of forgone imports to U.S. production.
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